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ABSTRACT
The overreaction hypothesis, as postulated by De Bondt and Thaler (1985) dictates that “stocks
that have performed poorly in the past (loser stocks) tend to outperform stocks that have
performed well in the past (winner stocks)” (DeBondt, et al., 1985). On the other hand, the
under-reaction hypothesis argues that stock’s return shows momentum, whereby winner stocks
continue to exhibit high returns in future periods, reflecting tendency of investors to underweigh the extent of new information. The aim of this thesis is to investigate whether shortterm overreaction or under-reaction appears in the Egyptian Exchange (EGX) over the period
of January 1998 to December 2013, making this the first attempt to test these market anomalies
in an Arab stock market. The thesis surveys the overreaction/under-reaction literature focusing
on the differences in methodologies and results across the various sample markets and
timeframes. The thesis compares two standard methodologies in the literature, that of Ali et al
(2011) and Clare & Thomas (1995), to test the overreaction/under-reaction hypothesis over
various holding periods ranging from one week to 52 weeks. The analysis reveals that while
short-term overreaction doesn’t exist in the Egyptian Exchange, there is statistically significant
evidence of under-reaction for the holding periods of one to four weeks. This motivates further
tests to establish the profitability of utilizing this evidence of under-reaction by applying a
momentum strategy that invests in winner stocks. The results show that while a momentum
strategy can provide significant abnormal returns of up to 0.885% over a holding period of four
weeks, when trading costs are taken into account, the profitability of the momentum strategy
becomes insignificant.
The thesis further analyzes whether size of the company can explain the evidence of underreaction. This is done on the basis of creating portfolios with large and small capitalization
stocks. For large capitalization stocks, an under-reaction that is statistically significant over
holding periods from 1 to 3 weeks is found. The overall result for this thesis suggests that while
evidence of under-reaction appears for Egyptian listed stocks, this is concentrated in large
firms. Investor, however, cannot profit from this market anomaly by applying a momentum
strategy since after taking into account trading costs involved in trading Egyptian stocks, the
profitability of this strategy diminishes.
Keywords: Overreaction; Under-reaction; momentum strategy; Market Efficiency; Return
reversals; Market anomalies; Market capitalization
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION
1.1 Overview of Capital Markets
The efficient market hypothesis (EMH) is a controversial issue that is often disputed both
empirically and theoretically. Fama in 1995 defined the efficient market as ”a market where
there are large numbers of rational, profit-maximizers actively competing, with each trying to
predict future market values of individual securities, and where important current information is
almost freely available to all participants. In an efficient market, competition among the many
intelligent participants leads to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual
securities already reflect the effects of information based both on events that have already
occurred and on events which, as of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other
words, in an efficient market at any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good
estimate of its intrinsic value” (F.Fama, 1995).
So according to the EMH, markets are rational and their prices should respond only to the arrival
of new information that gets incorporated in prices instantaneously making it impossible for
investors to beat or predict the market using technical or fundamental analysis.
Fama showed evidence in favor of market efficiency. He argued that contrarian strategies don’t
work in such type of markets because prices tend to be at their fundamental values. Further,
Fama intensifies the random walk implication of the efficient market hypothesis which states
that, future changes in stock prices should be un-predictable.

However, a large strand of

academic studies since early 1980’s emerged to criticize the notion of capital market efficiency.
These studies documented evidences of capital markets anomalies that seem to contrast the
efficient market hypothesis.
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“Capital market anomalies refer to situations when securities’ prices deviate or depart from the
norm” (Iqbal, et al., 2013). These deviations indicate either market inefficiency or inadequacies
in the underlying asset-pricing model. Anomalies could be fundamental, technical or calendar
related, and they are either a one-time occurrence or a persistent event. Persistent anomalies are a
concern since they could produce future outperformance of the market; however there is no
guarantee of this.
The number of these documented anomalies is large and continues to grow. An example of these
growing anomalies is the “Calendar effect”, which includes the observed different behaviour of
stock markets on different calendar days, months, or different times of the year in gener. The
most important calendar anomalies are the January effect and the weekend effect. Another
example of stock market anomalies could be the “small-firm effect”. This anomaly states that
firms that are small in size (smaller capitalization) tend to outperform larger ones, this
outperformance is driven by the company’s potential to grow and inevitably smaller companies
business has more chance to grow, while big companies have less room for growing
This thesis aims at testing one of these anomalies in one of the Arab stock markets, the
“Egyptian Exchange”. The anomaly of concern here is the short-term Over/under-reaction
hypothesis. The overreaction-first noted by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) in the US stock marketdictates that “stocks that have underperformed the market over a period of time will outperform
the market over a subsequent and similar time period” (DeBondt, et al., 1985). While Jegadeesh
and Titman (JT) were the first to refer to the under-reaction patterns in returns, when they used a
sample of stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX, for the period between 1965 and 1989.
The Arab Stock Markets are small in terms of market capitalization as they account for
approximately 16 per cent1 of the total market capitalization of the 21 emerging markets2 and for

1

Per cent is calculated based on information from MSCI.com (2014)
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Emerging markets are (Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia,
Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey)

2

1.76 per cent3 of the world’s stock market capitalization of $54.57 trillion4 in 2012 (Perry, 2013),
and there exists to the best of my knowledge no study on short-term over/under-reaction on the
cross-section of any of the Arab stocks markets so far.
This study provides insights about the dynamics of one of the Arab stock markets by examining
the short-run over or under-reaction phenomenon in “the Egyptian Stock Exchange” using
weekly closing prices data of all stocks listed in the exchange. The test period is from January
1998 to December 2013, which is chosen to reflect most of the significant economic and political
events Egypt passed by since the re-opening of the Egyptian Exchange in early 1990s. This study
relies on combination of methodologies, and by comparing the results of the methodologies; it is
intensified that there is an evidence of short-term under-reaction in the Egyptian Exchange,
The rest of the thesis is organised as follows. Section II will present the literature review of the
main studies of the over/under-reaction hypothesis. Section III will present the data, and
methodology used in this thesis. Section IV will provide the results of this empirical study and
section V concludes with areas for future research.

3

This ratio is calculated based on what is officially published by Mubasher.info that Arab stock exchanges reach
$960.2 billion on March 18,2012, and the information from the World Federation of Exchanges that total world’s
market capitalization in 2012 is $54.57 trillion (Mubasher, 2012)
4

The Paris-based World Federation of Exchanges, an association of 52 regulated stock market exchanges around the
world, recently released data on the world stock market capitalization for December 2012. As of December, the total
value of world equities was $54.57 trillion
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CHAPTER II

THE OVER AND UNDER-REACTION LITERATURE

The key strand of literature in which this thesis falls tests whether market anomalies that
contradict the efficient market hypothesis do exist. In Figure (1), a mapping of market anomalies
in literature is summarized

To study whether there are
abnormal returns in capital markets
Yes

NO
The market is efficient

Market anomalies do exist

Calendar market

Technical market

Fundamental

anomalies

anomalies

market anomalies

Figure (1): Market anomalies

2.1 Related Literature: Calendar-related market anomalies
Calendar anomalies, also known as seasonal anomalies, are irregular pattern of stock returns that
are related with a particular time period. They include the day of the week effect, turn of the
month effect, January effect and the holiday effect.
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The day of the week effect, that is also known as the weekend effect exhibits relatively larger
Friday returns as compared to Monday returns, where Friday and Monday being the last and the
first trading days of the week respectively. According to Nawaz and Mirza, “This is attributable
to the trading patterns of the individual investors. However, in the recent time period a reverse
weekend effect has been observed where Monday returns have yielded more than the Friday
returns contributed by the change in the trading pattern of investors” (Nawaz, et al., 2012).
The January effect is another calendar anomaly according to which stock market returns increase
in the month of January more than in any other month. Various studies have reported “window
dressing” by institutional investor as the reason behind what is called the January effect. For
example, according to Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny (1991), “at the end of the
calendar year, institutional investors may be prone to sell losers and buy winners to improve
perceived performance” (Lakonishok, et al., 1991). As documented in the literature, size and tax
loss selling are two other contributors to the January effect. Small size stocks tend to generate
higher returns in January as compared to large stocks, as concluded by Haug and Hirschey
(2006) when examining returns of the US equities. Tax loss selling phenomenon indicates that
stocks which are expected to have low returns (losers) towards the end of the year are sold and
stocks which are expected to have higher returns (winners) are held till the beginning of the New
Year. These stocks are then sold in January and thereafter the loser stocks replace winner stocks
in a portfolio. Ritter (1988) explained this behavior by quoting that “individuals apparently sell
stocks that have declined in price in December in order to realize the tax losses, and then, they do
not immediately reinvest all of the proceeds from these sales in other stocks, but they wait until
January, as this January buying may be augmented by cash infusions from year-end bonuses and
from the sales of larger firms on which long-term capital gains are being realized” (Ritter, 1988)

2.2 Related Literature: Technical market anomalies
Technical analysis is theoretically defined as using analyzing techniques to forecast future prices
of stocks on the basis of past prices and relevant past information. If the EMH holds, these
techniques are of no use. On the other hand, when the efficient market hypothesis does not hold,
and when techniques as the moving average, and trading range break find their way to predict
5

future prices, we can ensure that there exist what we can call technical market anomalies. The
existence of momentum is an evidence of this type of market anomaly. As according to
momentum, rising asset prices will continue to rise, and falling asset prices will continue to fall.
Consequently, in the next period, stocks that showed strong performance in the past continue to
outperform stocks that showed poor performance in the past. Investors can make use of this
anomaly, and make abnormal returns by implementing a momentum strategy that sells loser
stocks and buy winner stocks.

2.3 Related Literature: Fundamental market anomalies
Fundamental anomalies state that prices of stocks do not reflect the stocks’ fair values. These
anomalies include value anomaly, dividend yield anomaly, over/under-reaction anomaly, low
price to earnings ratio anomaly, and low price to earnings anomaly.
The value anomaly for example occurs as a result of investors overestimating the future earnings
of growth companies and underestimating those of value companies (Graham, et al., 1962). As
documented by Lakonishok, “this overestimation from individual investors perspective may be
due to judgment errors and extrapolate past growth rates of growth stocks, on the other hand
institutional investors that do not make judgement errors, prefer growth stocks as they appear to
be "prudent" investments, and hence are easy to justify to sponsors” (Lakonishok, et al., 1994).
In the coming few paragraphs the literature of overreaction and under-reaction anomaly which is
the main focus of this thesis will be discussed in details.

2.3.1 Defining the over and under-reaction hypotheses
The Overreaction Hypothesis occurs when stock prices rise (fall) too much in response to good
(bad) news. A manifestation of this phenomenon could be that when bad news arrives to the
stock market regarding certain stocks, investors panic at first and start trading based on this
misconception, consequently prices of these stocks fall sharply and lead to mispricing. Later,
when investors realise the true extent of the news, they start to trade in the opposite direction so
6

that prices subsequently correct themselves. The opposite exactly occurs for stocks associated
with good news; their prices tend to overshoot upon the arrival of the news because of investor’s
misjudgement and then when investors know they were over optimistic they tend to trade in the
opposite direction leading to price reversals to their reasonable levels. “Based on this
“overreaction phenomenon”, the subsequent price reversal should be predictable from past
returns data, and consequently adopting a contrarian strategy that sells winners stocks and buys
loser ones sometimes leads to abnormal profits benefiting from this overreaction” (Ali, et al.,
2011). The under-reaction hypothesis, in contrast, is characterised by a lower than optimal
response of the market to information. This under-reaction” of investors to newly arrived
information stems from investors being conservative. Investors then gradually adapt to news
recently flowing into the market, and start to incorporate their predictions into prices
Both over and under-reaction are important indicators of market inefficiency as they sometimes
lead to achieving abnormal profits, which are returns that differ from the expected rate of return
and are not a compensation for risk, through implementing either a contrarian or a momentum
strategy.
Supporters of the efficient market hypothesis (EMH), as Harry Roberts (1967) and Fama (1970)
consider these reactions as chance occurrences which vanish when the methodology of study is
changed. But, on the other hand, Behavioral economists as Thaler (1990), and Tversky and
Kahneman (1974) consider over- and under-reaction, and other anomalies, as something natural.
They claim that human mind falls prey to many biases while making a decision, as overreacting
to private information signals and under-reacting to public information signals (Daniel, et al.,
1998). These biases, as mentioned by Kalb (2011) cause markets to show a behavior that may
not be in complete harmony with what the standard finance theories expect.
The over/under-reaction can be analyzed from any of two perspectives, a long-run perspective
using monthly or yearly data or a short-run perspective using daily or weekly data. Although the
focus in this study is on short-term stock market over/under-reaction, including the long-term
literature is important as it provides a stronger theoretical foundation.
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Both the long-term and short-term perspectives are detailed in the following subsection to show
that there is mixed evidence in the literature on whether long-term and short-term over and
under-reaction occurs.

2.3.2 Long-term overreaction
De Bondt and Thaler (1985) motivated most other research on overreaction, after being able to
document return reversals over long horizons ranging from 3 to 5 years. The authors found using
US data that stocks which experienced bad performance over the past three to five year period
(losers) tend to outperform winners over the following three to five years. This implies that
investors using a contrarian investment strategy could earn a highly significant abnormal profit.
Zarowin (1989) examined the subsequent stock return performances of firms that have
experienced extreme earnings years and found that losers outperform the winners by a
statistically significant amount over the subsequent 36 months. However, he pointed out that at
the time of portfolio formation losers were significantly smaller than the winners. But, when the
losers were matched with the winners of the same size, there was virtually no evidence of
differential stock return performance. Zarowin claimed that “the market does not over- react to
extreme earnings news, and suggesting that size discrepancies between winners and losers may
be responsible for the apparent overreaction phenomenon” (Zarowin, 1990) . Motivated by these
findings, Zarowin re-examined DeBondt and Thaler (1985), and criticised their result. He was
able to dismiss the overreaction phenomenon presented by them as an explanation of the size
effect.
A point consistent with Zarowin’s (1990) result is Clare and Thomas’s (1995) attempt to
investigate the long-run overreaction in the UK stock market. Clare and Thomas found an
evidence of limited economically insignificant difference in the performance of previous losers
and previous winners over the period 1955 to 1990, moreover this limited overreaction, where
the losers outperformed the winners, was attributed to the size effect, as they found that losers
tended to be smaller than winners. In contrast to Zarowin (1990) and Clare and Thomas (1995),
Dissanaike (2002) concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that the size effect explains the
difference in the performance between winners and losers in the UK stock market.
8

Investigating this long-term overreaction anomaly in the Canadian equity market, Kryzanowski
and Zhang (1992) documented no evidence of overreaction, rather, they found that Canadian
stocks have tended to show evidence of momentum as investors under-react to new information
by failing to reflect news instantaneously in their transaction prices
As documented by Lobe and Rieks (2011), “research from several countries, such as that by
Alonso and Rubio (1990) from Spain, da Costa (1994) from Brazil, Meyer (1994), Mun,
Vasconcellos, and Kish (1999) and Schiereck, DeBondt, and Weber (1999) from Germany, or by
Baytas and Cakici (1999), who examined seven developed countries, finding overreaction in all
but the United States, shows that long-term overreaction is persistent even when the critic’s
arguments are accounted for” (Lobe, et al., 2011).

2.3.3 Short-term overreaction
The availability of more frequent datasets from around the world motivated more recent research
to examine the question in short-term.
Lehmann (1990) examined whether short-term overreaction existed in the US stock market in
weekly returns. He found evidence that "winner" and "loser" portfolios that are formed in one
week exhibit return reversals the next week allowing short-term contrarian strategies to realize
statistically significant profits even after accounting for bid-ask spreads and plausible
transactions costs. This result is consistent with that of Debondt and thaler (1985) study in the
long-term
Similarly in the US, Lo and MacKinlay (1990) questioned whether the profitability of contrarian
investment strategies necessarily implies stock market overreaction. They introduced a
“decomposition process” so as to determine whether a lead/ lag effect or an overreaction to firm
specific information is a main reason behind the short-term contrarian profits. Lo and MacKinlay
reported less than half of the profits to overreaction and claimed that a lead/lag effect is the main
reason behind the majority of the observed short-term contrarian profits (Lo, et al., 1990).
Contradicting Lo and MacKinlay (1990), Jegadeesh and Titman (1995), examined the New York
9

and American stock exchanges to check whether there is any evidence for the existence and
possible sources of short-term contrarian profits. They found that short-term contrarian profits
are predominantly the result of an overreaction to firm specific information and not the result of
lead/lag effects as suggested by Lo and MacKinlay. Indeed, Jegadeesh and Titman found only a
small fraction (less than 1%) of the short-term contrarian profits are due to the lead/lag effect. In
a follow up paper by Conrad et al. (1997), it was claimed that the significant profits due to price
reversals of Lehmann (1990) and Lo and MacKinlay (1990) may not reflect the overreaction
anomaly but may instead be generated entirely by market microstructure effects, such as the bidask bounce (Conrad, et al., 1997) .
In another attempt to examine the short term overreaction in New York Stock Exchange, Atkins
and Dyl [1990] using daily data, showed that stock prices overreact in the short run, especially to
negative information, however the magnitude of this statistically significant overreaction, is
small compared to the bid-ask spreads observed for these stocks. Thus, this overreaction does not
violate the EMH as it could not be exploited because of bid-ask spreads. However, Akhigbe,
Gosnell, and Harikumar [1998] argue that bid-ask spread used by Atkins and Dyl [1990] to
represent transaction costs does not reflect the round-trip trading costs faced by investors. So
they addressed this shortcoming by using a more developed measure of bid-ask spread, and
documented significant stock price reversals. They added that, “Except for the greatest losers,
using a simple trading rule to exploit the excess profit net of transaction costs is not possible”
(Akhigbe, et al., 1998).
Cox & Peterson (1994) also examined the US market trying to explore the role of the bid-ask
bounce, market liquidity, and overreaction in explaining price reversals in the three-day period
immediately following large one-day decline. They concluded that price reversals in short term
can be explained by “bid-ask bounce” and “degree of market liquidity”, and that overreaction
vanishes with rising market liquidity (Cox, et al., 1994).
Outside the US, there are fewer studies of short-term overreaction than of long-term
overreaction. These studies include Bowman & Iverson’s (1998) study that covered the New
Zealand stock market. Based on empirical evidence they concluded that short term overreaction
does exist there.
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In the UK, Spyrou, Kassimatis, and Galariotis in their attempt to examine investor’s reaction to
market shocks in the UK stock market in the short term for the period from 1989 to 2004 using
daily closing prices, reported that “the market reaction to shocks for large capitalization stock
portfolios is consistent with the Efficient Market Hypothesis. However, for medium and small
capitalization stock portfolios their results indicate significant under-reaction to both positive and
negative shocks for many days subsequent to a shock” (Spyrou, et al., 2007)
In Japan, Bremer, Hiraki, and Sweeney (1997) documented short-term overreaction. In addition,
Iihara, Kato and Tokunaga (2004) examined the Japanese markets for short-term overreaction
using data from Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) and found that overreaction explains the 1-month
return reversal in Japan.
Several studies have been done on emerging markets such as Malaysia and Johannesburg. These
studies have to be taken into consideration while doing anomalies test in Egypt as these countries
are very close in structure and functioning to the Egyptian market. For example, a study that was
done by Ali, Ahmad, and V. Anusakumar (2011) who investigated short-term overreaction in
Bursa Malaysia and concluded that an investor could make abnormal profits that are highly
significant especially for periods ranging between 1 and 12 weeks by implementing a short term
contrarian strategy that buys loser stocks and sells winner stocks. In addition, their results also
imply that this profitable contrarian strategy will yield even higher profits if focused on lowvolume stocks, as they reported an inverse relationship between trading volume and
overreaction.
Another study was done on Johannesburg Stock Exchange by Hsieh & Hodnett (2011). The
authors were trying to examine the overreaction hypothesis in the JSE, and they found evidence
of overreaction Hypothesis in South Africa for the period from period from January 1993 to
March 2009
Beside evidences of short-term overreaction, evidences of short-term under-reaction are also
found. For instance, Schnusenberg & Madura (2001) investigated the short-term (daily) investor
over- an under-reaction to market shocks for six US indexes and reported evidence of underreaction. “They argue that the results they found reflects a model of investor psychology in
which investors interpret extremely positive news releases pessimistically and extremely
11

negative news releases optimistically” (Schnusenberg, et al., 2001). Another evidence of underreaction in the U.S. was given by Pritamani and Singal (2001). The authors found under-reaction
to price shocks.

Outside the U.S., Maher & Parikh (2011), while investigating the Indian stock market, found
evidence of under-reaction to bad news. They added that this under-reaction is mainly
concentrated in the medium and smaller capitalization stocks, in all periods except post-crisis.
2.3.4 Profitability of the over and under-reaction phenomena
Can investors make use of the over and under-reaction market anomalies? Many researches have
dealt extensively with this issue aiming at exploring the profitability of contrarian and
momentum strategies that follow the existence of overreaction and under-reaction respectively,
and different results were found. For the momentum strategy, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993)
showed that a momentum strategy, that buys the winner stocks that performed well in the past
and sells the losers stocks that performed poorly in the past of the previous six months, will
realize significant abnormal profits in the US markets over the period from 1965 to 1989 if held
for a holding period of 3- to 12-month.
A further evidence of profitable momentum strategy in the U.S market was reported by Chan,
Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1996) who documented that investors routinely under-react and,
therefore can exploit a momentum strategy at intermediate terms of 3 to 6 months by buying
recent winners and selling recent losers to make abnormal profits.
McInish, et al (2008), in their attempt to test the profitability of short-term contrarian and
momentum strategies in Asian markets found out that except for the Taiwan and Korea stock
markets, winner portfolios experience price reversals, while loser portfolios experience
momentum prices. However, contrarian strategy will realise significant profits only in Japan, and
momentum strategy will yield persistent and significant profits only in Japan and Hong Kong.
McInish, et al (2008) also documented in their paper that “Chui, Titman, and Wei (2003)
reported significant momentum profits for seven out of the eight Pacific Basin countries for the
period from (1975 to 2000). In particular, they found significant momentum profits in stocks of
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small-capitalization, low book-to-market ratio, and high turnover companies” (McInish, et al.,
2008).
Several papers demonstrate that the contrarian strategies resulting from the existence of
overreaction anomaly could be profitable. For example, De Bondt and Thaler (1985), and Chou,
Wei, and Chung (2007) documented highly profitable contrarian returns for US stocks and stocks
from Tokyo stock exchange respectively.

Conrad et al (1998) applied contrarian strategies to weekly transaction returns of NYSE/AMEX
stocks and concluded that the momentum strategy usually leads to statistically significant profits
at medium horizons, except during the 1926-1947 sub-period and that the contrarian strategy
leads to profits at long horizons that are only statistically significant, during the 1926-1947 subperiod.

Hameed and Ting (2000), Using Malaysian stock market data examined short-term contrarian
returns and trading volume and concluded the contrarian profits on actively and frequently traded
securities are significantly higher than that generated from less active securities.

Lee, Chan, Fatt and Kalev (2003) using weekly return data found significant short-term
contrarian profits in the Australian markets". Further they documented that Lee, Darren D., et al
(2003) in a follow up paper found that in Australia profits are to a great extent related to the
market capitalization of the firm as an indicator of its size with overreaction to information that
are specific to a firm being the major factor that contributes to short-term contrarian profits.
However, when transaction costs are accounted for, all profits are wiped out.
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CHAPTER III

DATA AND METHODOLOGY

3.1 Institutional Framework
The Egyptian Exchange (previously known as the Cairo and Alexandria Stock Exchange
(CASE)), is one of the oldest stock markets established in the Middle East. The Egyptian
Exchange traces its origins to 1883 when the Alexandria Stock Exchange was established,
followed by the Cairo Stock Exchange in 1903. As quoted on the Egyptian Exchange website
“Egypt adopts the vision of being the financial hub and investment gateway in the Middle East
and North African (MENA) Region that best serves its stakeholders” (The Egyptian Exchange,
2014). The Egyptian stock market has received increased attention in the last decade, especially
since it was considered one of the world’s best performing stock exchanges in 2005. As per
Standard & Poor’s and Morgan Stanley indices in 2005, Egypt surpassed any previously
established record, and outperformed both developed and emerging markets, which pushed the
Newsweek magazine to choose Egypt as one of the best 10 stock markets in the world for the
year 2005. The privatization program was very successful in 2005 and the Ministry of
Investment showed commitment to activate it through the stock exchange. The Egyptian
Exchange back at that time reported that “nineteen privatization deals worth L.E14.9 billion,
representing 94% of total privatization proceeds were conducted through the stock exchange
during this year, Consequently, CASE 30 index showed an extra-ordinary performance during
2005, recording the highest ever annual growth rate of 146% versus an increase of 135% and
122% during 2003 and 2004, respectively” (The Egyptian Exchange, 2005). When the global
financial crisis hit in 2008, the Egyptian Stock Exchange was in a better place compared to
several global markets which recorded higher losses than that of EGX as announced by Merrill
Lynch, however, CASE 30 index incurred 56% losses over the year 2008 since the Egyptian
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market was not isolated from the global financial crisis repercussions due to asset liquidation and
the decrease in shares value of the Egyptian companies listed in the EGX (The Egyptian
Exchange, 2008). In 2011, the year started with a phase of unrest and political turmoil, it started
with the 25th of January revolution,. In response to that, the Egyptian stock market had been shut
since 27 January, after losing 18% in the two trading days before closure. The exchange opened
again on Wednesday 23 March after closing for almost 8 weeks. On reopening, the market fell
by a further 8.9% (BBC News, 2014) . By the end of June 2013, the total market capitalization
of the listed stocks culminated at LE 322 billion (The Egyptian Exchange, 2013)
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Figure (2): Weekly price movements in EGX30

3.2 Data
In this study, our sample involves all stocks listed on Egyptian Exchange as of 31st of March
2014. We focus on weekly prices, as well as volume, market capitalization and number of
outstanding shares. Data of 16 years from January 1998 to December 2013 is used in this study
and was compiled from Reuters Eikon 2013 database. Unlike previous studies that focus on
sample cross-section of stocks listed on an exchange that are only part of an index, this study
takes into consideration all stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange.
For market benchmarking, the index employed in this study is the EGX 30 (previously named
CASE 30 Index). The start date of the index was January 2nd 1998, with a base value of 1000
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points. “EGX 30 index value is calculated in local currency terms and denominated in US
dollars since 1998. It includes the top 30 companies in terms of liquidity and activity. The Index
is weighted by market capitalization and adjusted by the free float. For a company to be included
in EGX 30 index, it must have at least 15% free float. This ensures market participants that the
index constituents truly represent actively traded companies and that the index is a good and
reputable measure for the Egyptian market” (The Egyptian Exchange, 2014).
Stocks are then filtered where the least active ones are excluded. The activity here is measured
using the same criteria the Egyptian Exchange uses to measure the activity of stocks to decide
whether they should be included in any of the three major indices. For example, for a company
to be included in EGX30 (includes the top 30 companies in terms of liquidity and activity), it
must be traded at least 50% of the trading days during a specific period. For example, if the total
number of traded days during the last six month period is 120 (5 x 4 x 6). The company must be
traded at least 60 days during this period to join the index (The Egyptian Exchange, 2013) . To
ensure that we have the most active stocks out of the sample, a second filtering criterion is used
which is the turnover ratio of the stocks. Turnover ratio is the trading volume divided by the
number of shares outstanding. Stocks with average annual turnover ratio less than 80 % (lowest
decile) are excluded.
We further exclude observations around political events (the post-revolution closure of EGX for
two months in 2011). This gives us 827 weekly observations of 184 stocks representing 84.40
percent of the entire universe of listed securities (as per 2014 list). Appendix A and B of this
thesis provides a summary of stocks used in this study, outlining their sector, market
capitalization, listing date as well as descriptive statistics on their weekly returns over the sample
period.

3.3 Methodology
As a first test of the Overreaction or under-reaction hypotheses in the Egyptian stock market, the
same standard study techniques used by Ali et al. (2011) while testing the overreaction
hypothesis in Bursa Malaysia are used. Afterwards, the methodology used by Clare and Thomas
(1995) is being combined with our first methodology to check the robustness of the results. For
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simplicity, let’s call Ali et al. (2011) methodology by” Methodology 1”, and Clare and Thomas
(1995) by “Methodology 2”
In both methodologies, we find the stocks’ abnormal returns, based on which stocks are ranked
and assigned to either a portfolio of losers or to a portfolio of winners. These losers and winners
portfolios are then held for H weeks, where H takes the value of 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52.
Cumulative average returns (CARs) are then computed for each holding period, and finally the
average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is computed for the winners, losers and the
arbitrage portfolios over the formation period as well as each of the holding periods. The way we
test the over/under-reaction hypothesis is what differentiates the two methodologies. In
methodology 1, we simply check the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio over the holding periods,
whether it is positive, negative or equals to zero, and check its statistical significance as well and
find out whether the result indicates over/under-reaction or supports the efficient market
hypotheses. In methodology 2, we compare the means of the winner and loser portfolio returns
by regressing the return of the arbitrage portfolio against a constant once (Test 1), and another
time by regressing the arbitrage portfolio, against the market risk premium (Test 2).Based on the
results (either Overreaction, under-reaction or efficient market hypothesis) we will measure the
profitability of employing a contrarian or a momentum strategy.
The Final analysis will involve testing the relationship between the resulted over/under-reaction
and size of the firm as measured by its market capitalization.

3.3.1 Finding stock’s abnormal returns
First, we measure stocks weekly returns as follows:

Where Ri,t-1 is the return for stock i at week t-1, Pt-1 is the price of the stock at time t-1, and Pt-2 is
the price of the stock at time t-2.
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Market adjusted returns (abnormal returns) are then calculated for all stocks weekly

Where Ri,t-1 is the return for stock i at week t-1, and Rm,t-1 is the return for the market at week t-1,
here Rm , is the return on EGX30 index.

3.3.2 Portfolio formation
Stocks are then ranked in each week based on past week’s abnormal returns. In case of finding
stocks with the same abnormal return, a second ranking criterion is considered. It ranks stocks
based on their past week’s trading volume. Stocks are assigned accordingly to one of two
portfolios, either the winner portfolio or the loser portfolio. Where the top one third of stocks
constitute the winner portfolio and the bottom one third construct the loser portfolio, we took the
top and bottom one third of stocks to construct the portfolios instead of deciles and quintiles
following the same concept followed by Ali et al (2011) in which they state that they did so due
to the smaller number of stocks compared to studies in other markets (Ali, et al., 2011).
Consequently equally weighted winner and loser portfolios are formed weekly.

3.3.3 Holding periods
The portfolios are then held for H weeks, where H takes the value of 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52.
These specific pins (1,2,3,4,12,24,36,or 52 months) are meant to account for investors with
different time horizons. Portfolio returns are found in the formation period, and in each of the
holding periods.
Since we have equally weighted portfolios, we find the portfolios’ returns using the following
formula
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Where,

is the expected return on portfolio P, and

is the weight of stock i in the

portfolio
Holding periods’ returns are calculated using the cumulative average returns (CARs), which is
the sum of abnormal returns over H weeks (where H takes the value 1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52).

3.3.4 Testing the overreaction and under-reaction hypotheses
Finally, the average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) is computed for the winner and loser
portfolios as follows:

Where ACARp is the average CAR for portfolio P, and N represents the test periods.

3.3.4.1 Applying Methodology 1
The ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio is the difference between the ACAR for the loser and that
of the winner (i.e. ACARLoser – ACARwinner)
In an efficient market that difference should be zero (ACARL – ACARW=0), but in case that
overreaction exists, this difference should be greater than zero (ACAR L – ACARW>0). On the
contrary, if (ACARL – ACARW<0), this indicates that the market under-reacts to the arrival of
new information.
In order to assess the statistical significance of ACAR, the t-statistic has been used which is
calculated as follows:
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Where,

is the standard deviation of CARs, and N is the number of test periods.

The post 2011 Revolution period is also investigated for the existence of over and under-reaction
using the same steps mentioned above but starting from January 2011 to December 2013, for 149
weeks.

3.3.4.2 Applying Methodology 2:
According to Clare and Thomas (1995), if the return on the difference portfolio (Loser-winner) is
insignificantly different from zero, the overreaction hypothesis should be rejected, and if the
return is a significant positive value, the overreaction hypothesis is accepted.
In this study the same two tests used by Clare and Thomas are used. Where the first test is based
on comparing the means of the winner and loser portfolio returns by regressing the return of the
difference portfolio against a constant.

Where

is a constant and

is a white noise error term.

This regression is done for t=1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52, which represents all the holding periods we
have in this study. Then a simple t-test on the significance of the constant

tells us whether

there is a difference in the performance between winner and loser stocks.
A significant positive value for

confirms that an evidence of the overreaction.

The second test is done by regressing the difference portfolio, against the market risk premium.
However, due to data limitations and the difficulty of getting the risk free rate as being
represented by Egypt’s T-bills historically since 1998, the regression is done against the market
return. This test as quoted by Clare and Thomas (1995) “allows us to control for possible
different exposures to systematic risk which may explain the differential returns between the
winner and loser portfolios” (Clare, et al., 1995).
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Where the intercept

term, is the Jensen performance index

represents the difference between the market beta of
RM, is cumulative return on the EGX30 index t=1,2,3,4,12,24,36, or 52 holding periods.
is a white noise error term and where t represents the appropriate period after portfolio
formation.
As postulated by Clare and Thomas, “a significantly positive value for
confirmation of the Overreaction Hypothesis. If

can be seen as

is significantly different from zero then

differences in systematic risk explain some of the difference in returns. A significantly positive
value for

means that losers bear more systematic risk than winners” (Clare, et al., 1995).

3.3.5 Testing the relationship between over/under-reaction and Firm size
For the second part of the analysis, we investigated the over/under-reaction hypothesis within
each market-capitalization category, targeting to check whether our result is explained by the
size of the firm as well as to find the relationship between the over/under-reaction hypothesis and
firm size.
The market capitalization at the end of the previous week is used to sort the stocks into Largemarket capitalization stocks and Small-market capitalization stocks. Following this, stocks
within each market-capitalization category are sorted again based on past week excess returns to
form winner and loser portfolios.
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CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS

4.1 Sample Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics of the total sample used is provided in Table 1. The final sample consists of
184 stocks of those listed in the Egyptian exchange. The study covers 827 weeks. The average
weekly return for all the 184 stocks is 0.124%, which translates to 6.67% annualized. The
average weekly market capitalization for the stocks included in the sample is LE 1,646 millions
and the average annual turnover ratio is
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for total sample

Number of stocks
Number of weeks
Average weekly return (%)
Average weekly market capitalization in LE million
Average annual turnover ratio (%)

184
827
0.124
1,646
292.241

4.2 Results of Methodology 1
4.2.1 Analyzing the Whole Sample
Table 2 presents the result of testing the overreaction or under-reaction hypotheses for the whole
sample. The table shows the average abnormal return during the formation period for the winner,
loser and arbitrage (loser-winner) portfolios and the average cumulative abnormal returns
(ACAR) for the three portfolios for 8 holding periods (1,2,3,4,12,24,36,or 52).
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Table 2: Average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) for the whole period for the winner (W), loser (L) and loserwinner portfolio (L-W)
Holding Period (weeks)

Formation Period
1

2

3

4

12

24

36

52

Portfolio

Winners
AVERAGE

6.459%

0.404%

0.616%

0.858%

0.884%

1.367%

1.441%

2.322%

3.443%

t-stat

24.917**

3.330**

3.442**

3.407**

3.114**

2.590**

1.965

2.591**

3.008**

Losers
AVERAGE

-5.541%

-0.016%

0.044%

0.007%

0.053%

0.522%

1.185%

1.088%

0.908%

t-stat

-50.575**

-0.102

0.188

0.027

0.176

1.025

1.631

1.200

0.787

Arbitrage Portfolio
AVERAGE

-11.999%

-0.420%

-0.572%

-0.850%

-0.831%

-0.845%

-0.256%

-1.233%

-2.534%

t-stat

-46.74**

-2.727**

-2.557**

-3.073**

-2.845**

-1.759

-0.389

-1.500

-2.495*

** Significance at 1% level
* Significance at 5% level

For the winner portfolio, it is obvious that weekly winners exhibit price momentum. There is a
strong positive return in week t-1, followed by statistically significant at the (1% level) positive
returns for the holding periods from 1 to 52 weeks, except for the holding period of 24 weeks,
where the return is significant at the (5% level). The returns for the winner portfolios are
gradually increasing along the holding periods, until a maximum return of 3.44% is reached at
the holding period of 52 weeks with statistical significance of at the (1% level). Hence, a return
momentum appears to gradually increase for the winner stocks along the 8 holding periods.
In contrast to the winner portfolios, the loser ones exhibit price reversals. They showed a strong
negative return in the portfolio formation period that slightly increases at the holding period of 1
week, and continued in this increasing trend till the holding period of 24 weeks then starts to
decline for the holding periods of 36 and 52 weeks. However, the return for the loser portfolios is
positive for all the holding periods except for the holding period of 1 week, though the returns
are not statistically significant.
The result states that In general, “winner” stocks display subsequent price momentum while
“loser” stocks show price reversals. The result corroborates that of Fung, Leung, & Patterson
(1999) who studied the profitability of implementing a trading strategy based on the one-day
price performance in six Pacific Basin markets during the period between 1980 and 1993. In
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general, they found that daily winners exhibit price momentum, while losers show price reversals
during the following one to five trading days. This result may also be related to the “Uncertain
Information Hypothesis”, claimed by Brown, Harlow, and Tinic (1988). This hypothesis states
that investors react more strongly to bad news than to good news. Which means that winner
stocks associated with good news will show price continuation (momentum), while loser stocks
associated with negative news will exhibit an average abnormal return that is positive (price
reversal). Therefore, as quoted by Fama (1998) “there is something about investor’s psychology
that causes simultaneous under-reaction to some types of events, and overreaction to others”
(Fama, 1998)
The last row in Table 2 provides the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio for each of the 8 holding
periods, which is defined as the difference in the ACAR between the loser and winner portfolios.
Although, we have positive returns for the loser portfolios for the holding periods from 2 to 52
weeks, the ACAR for the arbitrage portfolio is negative which gives a sign of under-reaction.
These negative returns for the arbitrage portfolio for all the holding periods can be attributed to
the price continuation (momentum) of the winner portfolio. The result for the arbitrage portfolio
is significant at the (1% level) for the holding periods from 1 to 4 weeks and for the holding
period of 52 weeks it is significant at the (5% level). The remaining holding periods of 12, 24
and 36 weeks the result is not significant.
4.2.2 Post-revolution Analysis
In analyzing the post revolution period that consists of 149 weeks, Table 3 shows that for the
winner portfolio there is a strong significant positive return in the portfolio formation period that
starts to decline gradually exhibiting price reversals. The reversals are not significant for the
holding periods from 1 to 24 weeks, however it is statistically significant at the (1% level) for the
holding period of 36 and 52 weeks. The loser portfolio, on the contrary showed price momentum
during the post revolution period, however the result is not significant except for the holding
period of 36 weeks, where it is statistically significant at the (5% level), and that of 52 weeks
where it is statistically significant at the (1% level). For the arbitrage portfolio, the results
showed under-reaction that is not significant statistically.
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Table 3: Average cumulative abnormal return (ACAR) for the post revolution period for the winner (W),

loser (L) and loser-winner portfolio (L-W)
Holding Period (Weeks)
Formation Period
1

2

3

4

12

24

36

52

Portfolio

winners
AVERAGE

4.636%

0.168%

0.165%

0.030%

-0.087%

-0.492%

-1.415%

-2.741%

-5.785%

t-stat

20.052**

0.827

0.554

0.083

-0.209

-0.696

-1.463

-2.510**

-5.827**

Losers
AVERAGE

-4.365%

-0.274%

-0.412%

-0.455%

-0.354%

-0.345%

-0.647%

-2.272%

-4.744%

t-stat

-21.389**

-1.284

-1.332

-1.116

-0.746

-0.479

-0.634

-2.047*

-4.673**

Arbitrage Portfolio
AVERAGE

-9.001%

-0.442%

-0.577%

-0.485%

-0.267%

0.147%

0.768%

0.470%

1.041%

t-stat

-34.837**

-1.934

-1.761

-1.164

-0.565

0.242

1.068

0.601

1.241

** Significance at 1% level
* Significance at 5% level

The price reversals and price momentum for winner and loser portfolios respectively during the
post revolution period can be attributed to the panic and irrationality that investors investing in
the Egyptian exchange had after the revolution, when they try to cling to every piece of good
news that might reduce their levels of fear and anxiety. After the revolution, Investors tend to
attach excessively optimistic expectations with stocks associated with favorable information
trying to benefit from every good news entering the market quickly before it goes, so they rush in
buying stocks with good news and later on they realize they had overreacted. Consequently,
prices return to their fundamental values. The opposite exactly occurs for stocks accompanied
with unfavorable news. This result supports that of Brown et al. (1988) who theorized that the
reaction of investors to good news is stronger than their reaction to bad news.
Overall, this study documents an evidence of under-reaction in the Egyptian exchange that is
statistically significant for the holding periods of 1 to 4 weeks. The under-reaction means that the
momentum traders can profit by trend-Chasing. Therefore, a momentum strategy that buys
winner stocks and sells loser stocks5 seems to be profitable for the holding period from 1 to 4
weeks. However, as shown in Table 4, when we account for the prevailing fees rate in the market
asked for by financial brokers, as well as the transaction costs levied by the Egyptian Exchange,

5

Selling loser stocks is not considered here because short-selling is not allowed in Egypt
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resulting in a 3 in a thousand (0.3%) as total trading costs for each side of the transaction, we
found that implementing a momentum strategy will not yield significant profits. This result
supports that of Fung, et al (1999) when they found that momentum profits disappeared when
transaction costs were taken into account in six Pacific Basin markets.

Table 4: Momentum Strategy of buying Winner portfolios before and after applying a 0.6% round-trip Transaction costs
on periods when significant under-reaction exists

ACAR

Holding Period (Weeks)
1

2

3

4

Before trading cost

0.404%

0.616%

0.859%

0.885%

T-test

3.330**

3.442**

3.407**

3.114**

After trading cost

-0.196%

0.016%

0.259%

0.285%

T-test

-1.610

0.092

1.026

1.003

**Significance at 1% level
*Significance at the 5% level
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4.4.3 Results of methodology 2
As we mentioned above, we will apply Clare and Thomas’s (1995) methodology of testing the
over/under-reaction hypothesis. By comparing the two methodologies together we can check
whether our previous results were valid and robust

Table 5: Using Clare and Thomas’s (1995) methodology of testing the over/under-reaction hypothesis.

Test 2

Test 1

Holding Period (Weeks)
1

2

3

4

12

24

36

52

ACARW

0.404%

0.616%

0.858%

0.884%

1.367%

1.441%

2.322%

3.443%

ACARL

-0.016%

0.044%

0.007%

0.053%

0.522%

1.185%

1.088%

0.908%

ACARL-W

-0.420%

-0.572%

-0.850%

-0.831%

-0.845%

-0.256%

-1.233%

-2.534%

α1

-0.004

-0.006

-0.009

-0.008

-0.008

-0.003

-0.012

-0.025

t-stat

-2.727**

-2.557**

-3.074**

-2.845**

-1.759

-0.389

-1.500

-2.495*

α2

-0.005

-0.006

-0.009

-0.009

-0.010

-0.004

-0.011

-0.021

t-stat

-2.934**

-2.751**

-3.264**

-2.951**

-2.021*

-0.550

-1.253

-1.872

β

0.096

0.069

0.059

0.030

0.038

0.015

-0.012

-0.026

t-stat

2.700**

1.956

1.686

0.952

1.379

0.639

-0.504

-1.152

0.9%

0.5%

0.3%

0.1%

0.2%

0.05%

0.03%

0.2%

2

R

** Significance at 1% level
* Significance at 5% level

Table 5 presents results of our application of Clare and Thomas method that seem to confirm our
original findings. The results confirm that there is an evidence of significant under-reaction in
the Egyptian Exchange for the holding periods of 1 to 4 weeks as being clear from the significant
(at the 1% level) negative value for

.

Controlling for risk using Test 2, the significantly (at the 1% level) negative value for

for the

holding periods from 1 to 4 weeks; can be seen as confirmation of the under-reaction hypothesis.
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The significantly positive value for

for the holding period of 1 week means that losers may

embody more systematic risk than winners.

4.4.4 Investigating the Relationship between Under-reaction and Size
In the following, we proceed to investigate the relationship between under-reaction and the
firm’s size as measured by the market capitalization of stocks. The sample is divided into small
and large market capitalization categories. Where the top one third of stocks constitutes the large
market capitalization stocks and the bottom one third constructs the small market capitalization
stocks.
The results for the large market capitalization stocks are presented in Table 6.
Table 6: Testing under-reaction hypothesis within large capitalization stocks
Formation
Period

Holding Period (weeks)
1

2

3

4

12

24

36

52

Portfolio

Winners
ACAR

5.171%

0.087%

-0.412%

-0.668%

-1.028%

-3.001%

-5.713%

-8.089%

-10.714%

t-stat

9.697**

0.919

-0.823

-0.963

-1.164

-1.151

-1.326

-1.385

-1.546

ACAR

-4.232%

-0.199%

-0.877%

-1.190%

-1.454%

-3.975%

-6.723%

-9.507%

-12.505%

t-stat

-46.399**

-2.239*

-1.770

-1.763

-1.669

-1.571

-1.602

-1.646

-1.827

Losers

Arbitrage Portfolio
ACAR

-9.403%

-0.286%

-0.466%

-0.522%

-0.425%

-0.974%

-1.010%

-1.419%

-1.792%

t-stat

-17.542**

-2.761**

-3.309**

-2.963**

-2.117*

-1.567

-1.414

-1.824

-2.060*

** Significance at 1% level
* Significance at 5% level
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As shown in Table 6, for the large winner stocks, a strong highly significant positive return
appears in the formation period, it starts to decline showing notable price reversals along each of
the 8 holding periods. However, these price reversals are not significant statistically. On the
other hand, large losers continue to have negative returns for all the holding periods. A
significant under-reaction can be noticed for the holding period of 1, 2 and 3 weeks, as the
difference of the ACAR between the loser and winner portfolios is negative and statistically
significant at the (1% level). Whilst returns are negative at the holding periods of 4 to 52 weeks,
they are only significant at the (5%level) at the holding period of 4 weeks and that of 52 weeks.
For the rest of the holding periods none of the returns are significant.
The average abnormal cumulative returns (ACARs) for small capitalization stocks for the 8
holding periods are detailed in Table 7.
Table 7: Testing under-reaction hypothesis within small capitalization stocks
Formation Period

Holding Period (weeks)
1

2

3

4

12

24

36

52

Portfolio

winners
ACAR

5.322%

0.334%

-0.157%

-0.247%

-0.440%

-2.092%

-3.539%

-5.330%

-5.113%

t-stat

27.909**

2.010*

-0.184

-0.193

-0.255

-0.433

-0.453

-0.493

-0.405

Losers
ACAR

-5.367%

0.223%

-0.346%

-0.620%

-0.898%

-2.352%

-3.369%

-4.568%

-4.671%

t-stat

-39.713**

1.467

-0.407

-0.495

-0.522

-0.492

-0.437

-0.425

-0.376

Arbitrage Portfolio
ACAR

-10.689%

-0.111%

-0.188%

-0.374%

-0.458%

-0.260%

0.169%

0.762%

0.441%

t-stat

-63.864**

-0.853

-0.951

-1.527

-1.660

-0.562

0.276

1.027

0.493

** Significance at 1% level
* Significance at 5% level

The small winners exhibit price reversals starting from the holding period of 2 weeks up to that
of 52 weeks, but none of which are statistically significant. Small losers exhibit price momentum
for all of the holding periods except for the holding period of 1 week, but the results are not
significant exactly the same as for the small winners. This yields a negative difference between
the ACARs of the small loser and small winner stocks for the holding period from 1 to 12 weeks,
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which can be interpreted as under-reaction, however it is not statistically significant, and a
positive difference between ACARs of the small loser and small winner stocks for the holding
period from 24 to 52 weeks that is also not significant statistically.
Indeed the returns are clearly more prominent for large capitalization stocks than for small ones.
Overall, the evidence indicates that for large capitalization stock portfolios, there is a significant
under-reaction to market shocks for a number of days subsequent to a shock up to 21 days (3
weeks). Hence, large capitalization stocks tend to under-react more than small capitalization
stocks and exhibit correspondingly higher return momentum. This result seems to contradict that
of Spyrou Kassimatis, and Galariotis (2007). The three authors studied the UK market for shortterm investor reaction for the period 1989 to 2004, and they showed that the market reaction to
shocks for large capitalization stocks is consistent with the notion of market efficiency which
suggests that information is incorporated instantaneously in prices. However, for medium and
small capitalization stock portfolios, their results indicate significant under-reaction to market
shocks whether they are positive or negative shocks.
To sum up, the findings indicate that investors will not be able to profit from employing a
momentum strategy, to benefit from the significant under-reaction to good or bad news that is to
a great extent attributable to the “price momentum in the Egyptian Exchange in general and in
the large market capitalization stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange in specific, and this is due
to the round-trip transaction costs that wipe-out any statistically significant profits.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

The efficient market hypothesis is one of the basic foundations of standard finance. However,
several scholars have challenged the efficiency of stock markets by presenting empirical
evidence of stock market anomalies that seem to challenge the notion of market efficiency.
While evidence of anomalies exists, what remains controversial is the question of “Can investors
exploit these market anomalies to make superior profits?” As suggested by Kalb (2011), these
anomalies can appear in the market in the form of over- and under-reaction that in turn lead to
market inefficiency. The purpose of this study is to look for the existence of these anomalous
reactions in the short term in the Egyptian Exchange. This study employs weekly closing prices
data of all the stocks listed in the Egyptian Exchange as per 2014 list. All the data is obtained
from Thomson- Reuters® Eikon. We use several different testing methodologies to evaluate the
robustness of the results.
This thesis extends current knowledge by assessing the short-term over/under-reaction
phenomenon in the Egyptian Exchange for the period from 1998 to 2013. It produces no
evidence of the presence of the overreaction effect for the specified test period, but on the
contrary, our results seem to be supportive of the under-reaction hypothesis, that is robust to risk
and non-risk control. It finds evidence of under-reaction hypothesis for the holding periods
ranging from 1 to 4 weeks.
Further, after examining the relationship between the under-reaction found and the size of the
firm as being measured by the market capitalization, it shows that there exists a direct
relationship between under-reaction and size of the firm especially for the holding periods from 1
to 3 weeks.
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"One possible explanation of our results on evidence of under-reaction, specifically in large sized
stocks, might be attributed to institutional trading. Institutions on the Egyptian Stock Exchange
concentrate their trading in large sized companies and tend to outperform individual investors
both in the short and long term (Bassiouny & Tooma, 2013). It is also well documented that
institutional investors are momentum traders (Griffin et al, 2003) and therefore under-reaction
evidence might be attributed to institutional momentum trading strategies.

Based on the findings and after previewing the main results and conclusions a strong evidence of
under-reaction is found in the Egyptian Exchange and no evidence is found to support the
overreaction hypothesis. Evidence of under-reaction suggests that a momentum strategy of
buying winner stocks should results in profits. However, this anomaly could hardly be exploited
to obtain abnormal returns after accounting for the round-trip transaction costs levied by the
Egyptian Exchange.
Future research on this topic may be done using a multivariate regression model that accounts for
more variables that could affect over/under-reaction hypothesis. In addition, testing the
over/under-reaction hypothesis in other Arab stock exchanges as well as analyze further factors
that might contribute to the anomaly provide an avenue for future research.
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Appendix

Appendix A
The following table shows all the stocks that are used in the sample, their Reuters code, and their
date of listing as well as their market capitalization as of 7th of May 2014
Stocks

Reuters Code

Listing Date

Market Capitalization

Credit Agricole Egypt
Al Baraka Bank Egypt
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt - In US Dollars
Qatar National Bank Alahly
Union National Bank - Egypt " UNB-E
Commercial International Bank (Egypt)
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank- Egypt
Egyptian Gulf Bank
El Watany Bank of Egypt
Suez Canal Bank
Faisal Islamic Bank of Egypt - In EGP

Banks
CIEB.CA
03/07/1996
SAUD.CA
25/12/1984
FAITA.CA
07/06/1995
QNBA.CA
03/07/1996
UNBE.CA
05/11/1995
COMI.CA
02/02/1995
ADIB.CA
19/06/1996
EGBE.CA
17/11/1983
WATA.CA
12/09/1994
CANA.CA
15/09/1982
FAIT.CA
07/06/1995

4,104,100,000
1,265,835,120
2,481,245,651
15,812,498,436
672,262,500
34,092,831,050
1,514,000,000
1,932,530,661
2,464,000,000
994,000,000
630,418,115

EL Ezz Aldekhela Steel - Alexandria
Egypt Aluminum
Egyptian Iron & Steel
Asek Company for Mining - Ascom
Paper Middle East (Simo)
Rakta Paper Manufacturing
Ezz Steel

Basic Resources
IRAX.CA
17/09/1995
EGAL.CA
29/07/1997
IRON.CA
13/11/1958
ASCM.CA
08/10/2003
SIMO.CA
01/04/1997
RAKT.CA
15/11/1994
ESRS.CA
25/05/1999

9,609,012,947
2,165,000,000
5,167,654,351
508,200,000
46,050,000
217,800,000
8,947,574,995

Samad Misr -EGYFERT
Abou Kir Fertilizers
Misr Chemical Industries
Sidi Kerir Petrochemicals
Egyptian Chemical Industries (Kima)
Kafr El Zayat Pesticides
Egyptian Financial & Industrial

Chemicals
SMFR.CA
01/12/1999
ABUK.CA
12/09/1994
MICH.CA
03/08/1994
SKPC.CA
09/03/2005
EGCH.CA
16/08/1995
KZPC.CA
01/08/1996
EFIC.CA
10/03/1996

58,080,000
13,796,507,872
524,500,000
10,200,750,000
2,451,000,510
220,642,159
821,224,339

Delta Construction & Rebuilding
Egyptian for Developing Building Materials
Modern Company for water proofing (Bitumode)
Arab Valves Company
Paint & Chemicals Industries (Pachin)
El Ezz Porcelain (Gemma)
National Cement
Torah Cement
Misr Beni Suef Cement
Orascom Construction Industries (OCI)

Construction & Materials
DCRC.CA
12/09/1994
EDBM.CA
11/08/1999
WATP.CA
24/12/2001
ARVA.CA
14/02/2007
PACH.CA
03/08/1994
ECAP.CA
09/12/1998
NCEM.CA
30/11/1995
TORA.CA
30/03/1995
MBSC.CA
11/08/1999
OCIC.CA
03/09/1998

228,980,866
65,919,000
181,560,000
99,923,716
824,400,000
266,967,792
1,726,536,000
1,561,373,286
4,011,000,000
59,087,784,893
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Misr Conditioning (Miraco)
Alexandria Cement
Acrow Misr
Giza General Contracting
Upper Egypt Contracting
Nasr Company for Civil Works
Suez Cement
Arab Ceramics (Aracemco)
Sinai Cement
Misr Cement (Qena)
South Valley Cement

MRCO.CA
ALEX.CA
ACRO.CA
GGCC.CA
UEGC.CA
NCCW.CA
SUCE.CA
CERA.CA
SCEM.CA
MCQE.CA
SVCE.CA

07/04/1992
27/09/1995
15/09/1982
19/06/1997
07/05/1997
07/12/1997
08/02/1995
07/04/1992
03/07/2000
24/05/2000
08/10/1998

Financial Services excluding Banks
AMIA.CA
14/12/1995
ANFI.CA
04/11/1998
GRCA.CA
19/08/2009
AMER.CA
09/11/2010
EXPA.CA
14/12/1995
MOIN.CA
07/05/1995
KWIN.CA
08/09/1997
HDBK.CA
13/09/1983
DEIN.CA
03/07/1996
SEIG.CA
07/04/1992
ABRD.CA
30/09/1986
CCAP.CA
03/12/2009
AIND.CA
03/06/2010
REAC.CA
08/08/2006
AIVC.CA
06/09/2006
NAHO.CA
16/11/2006
EASB.CA
17/01/2007
BTFH.CA.
09/04/2008
PRMH.CA
23/04/2008
EOSB.CA
14/05/2008
PIOH.CA
22/06/2008
AFDI.CA
28/05/1997
HRHO.CA
10/02/1999
EKHO.CA
27/01/1999

Arab Moltaka Investments Co
Alexandria National Company for Financial Investment
Grand Investment Capital
Amer Group Holding
Export Development Bank of Egypt (EDBE)
Mohandes Insurance
El Kahera El Watania Investment
Housing & Development Bank
Delta Insurance
Saudi Egyptian Investment & Finance
Egyptians Abroad for Investment & Development
Citadel Capital - Common Shares
Arabia Investments,Development,Fin. Inv. Holding Comp.-Cash
Reacap Financial Investments
Al Arafa For Investment And Consultancies
Naeem Holding
Egyptian Arabian (cmar) Securities Brokerage EAC
Belton Financial Holding
Prime Holding
El Orouba Securities Brokerage
Pioneers Holding
El Ahli Investment and Development
Egyptian Financial Group-Hermes Holding Company
Egyptian Kuwaiti Holding

Food & Beverage
ALRA.CA
07/11/2012
POUL.CA
05/11/1995
EDFM.CA
19/06/1996
UEFM.CA
01/08/1996
ESGI.CA
29/05/1996
CEFM.CA
27/03/1996
SUGR.CA
07/04/1992
ADPC.CA
24/01/2001
NEDA.CA
25/11/1998
JUFO.CA
18/05/2010
INFI.CA
06/09/2010
ISMA.CA
07/06/1995
MPCO.CA
02/02/1995
IFAP.CA
23/12/1998
EPCO.CA
06/12/2001
NCMP.CA
18/04/2006
ELNA.CA
17/01/2007

Atlas For Land Reclamation and Agricultural Proccssing
Cairo Poultry
East Delta Flour Mills
Upper Egypt Flour Mills
Egyptian Starch & Glucose
Middle Egypt Flour Mills
Delta Sugar
The Arab Dairy Products Co. ARAB DAIRY
Northern Upper Egypt Development & Agricultural Production
Juhayna Food Industries
Ismailia National Food Industries
Ismailia Misr Poultry
Mansourah Poultry
International Agricultural Products
Egypt for Poultry
National company for maize products
El Nasr For Manufacturing Agricultural Crops
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806,700,000
3,053,842,744
286,504,594
470,205,015
951,300,000
136,200,000
7,106,952,294
986,250,000
2,449,300,000
2,056,801,520
3,886,990,130

425,568,205
34,772,375
62,478,000
5,684,232,322
1,291,680,000
106,875,000
64,365,000
2,185,000,000
148,950,000
67,720,000
232,798,530
5,508,000,000
1,192,210,907
370,145,876
790,584,300
1,053,982,245
114,375,000
244,693,010
238,813,669
27,195,000
6,655,000,000
245,400,000
7,552,790,865
6,408,392,122

69,640,000
1,922,973,696
263,700,000
506,940,000
441,366,345
373,815,320
1,576,976,652
453,600,000
34,890,000
8,077,255,598
107,370,000
269,617,913
114,050,309
305,142,434
119,196,000
783,855,665
150,858,909

North Cairo Mills
Bisco Misr
Alexandria Flour Mills
Middle & West Delta Flour Mills
South Cairo & Giza Mills & Bakeries
Cairo Oils & Soap
Extracted Oils
Misr Oils & Soap
Sharkia National Food

MILS.CA
BISM.CA
AFMC.CA
WCDF.CA
SCFM.CA
COSG.CA
ZEOT.CA
MOSC.CA
SNFC.CA

17/09/1995
19/06/1997
01/04/1997
11/05/1996
11/05/1996
05/05/1999
17/09/1995
01/08/1996
27/02/1995

301,312,000
701,500,000
166,000,000
396,525,000
122,310,000
113,600,000
204,360,000
74,580,000
100,979,106

Minapharm Pharmaceuticals
Medical Union Pharmaceuticals
Alexandria Pharmaceuticals
Cairo Pharmaceuticals
Nozha International Hospital
Cairo Medical Center
Medical Packaging Company
Egyptian International Pharmaceuticals (EIPICO)
Glaxo Smith Kline
Memphis Pharmaceuticals
Nile Pharmaceuticals
Arab Pharmaceuticals
Advanced Pharmaceutical Packaging Co. (APP)

Healthcare & Pharmaceuticals
MIPH.CA
11/01/2004
MEDU.CA
22/04/1997
AXPH.CA
27/02/1995
CPCI.CA
09/04/1996
NINH.CA
27/11/1997
MEDC.CA
24/07/2012
MEPA.CA
03/08/2011
PHAR.CA
27/09/1995
BIOC.CA
23/10/1985
MPCI.CA
27/09/1995
NIPH.CA
27/02/1995
ADCI.CA
06/02/1996
APPC.CA
29/12/1999

Engineering Industries (ICON)
Electro Cable Egypt
Egyptian Transport (EGYTRANS)
Alexandria Containers and goods
El Ahram Co. For Printing And Packing
ELSWEDY ELECTRIC
Delta For Printing & Packaging
Suez Bags
El Arabia Engineering Industries
El Nasr Transformers (El Maco)
Canal Shipping Agencies
Maridive & oil services
United Arab Shipping
Modern Shorouk Printing & Packaging
GB AUTO
Universal For Paper and Packaging Materials (Unipack)

Industrial Goods and Services and Automobiles
ENGC.CA
19/02/1982
158,063,400
ELEC.CA
30/03/1995
774,364,500
ETRS.CA
28/12/1992
228,475,500
ALCN.CA
16/08/1995
2,896,322,818
EPPK.CA
03/02/2003
51,272,000
SWDY.CA
18/05/2006
7,596,212,000
DTPP.CA
21/05/2008
84,980,000
SBAG.CA
07/04/1992
364,500,000
EEII.CA
05/11/1995
55,873,171
NASR.CA
11/05/1996
334,156,690
CSAG.CA
27/02/1995
2,412,000,000
MOIL.CA
07/04/1992
2,955,325,440
UASG.CA
07/04/1992
268,000,000
SMPP.CA
30/12/2002
164,358,000
AUTO.CA
07/03/2007
4,638,855,471
UNIP.CA
11/10/1995
74,160,000

GMC GROUP FOR INDUSTRIAL COMMERCIAL & FINANCIAL INVESTMENTS
Alexandria Mineral Oils Company

Oil & Gas
GMCI.CA
04/01/2006
AMOC.CA
22/12/2004
Personal & Household Products
KABO.CA
08/02/1995
EAST.CA
27/09/1995
APSW.CA
20/03/2002
SPIN.CA
17/09/1995
NCGC.CA
25/09/1996
ACGC.CA
08/07/1995
ORWE.CA
14/12/1994
PRCL.CA
10/03/1996

El Nasr Clothes & Textiles (Kabo)
Eastern Tobacco
ARAB POLVARA SPINNING & WEAVING CO.
Alexandria Spinning & Weaving (SPINALEX)
Nile Cotton Ginning
Arab Cotton Ginning
Oriental Weavers
Ceramic & Porcelain
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368,015,434
981,213,006
211,950,000
301,674,375
79,940,000
182,358,000
43,520,000
4,046,156,400
1,110,738,860
89,943,750
152,381,250
74,479,500
62,698,855

53,549,969
6,918,996,000

362,315,822
8,300,000,000
327,902,960
426,474,084
347,100,875
1,631,265,827
4,195,800,000
359,108,867

Real Estate
UNIT.CA
14/12/1994
EHDR.CA
03/08/1994
GIHD.CA
12/09/1994
OBRI.CA
18/06/1998
OCDI.CA
10/03/1998
PHDC.CA
27/12/2006
NHPS.CA
30/03/1995
ELKA.CA
30/03/1995
ELSH.CA
12/09/1995
DAPH.CA
19/06/1996
AREHA.CA
11/11/1998
AREH.CA
16/02/1998
MENA.CA
27/09/1995
NRPD.CA
07/04/1992
HELI.CA
07/05/1995
MNHD.CA
07/05/1995
ICID.CA
02/02/1985
IDRE.CA
16/06/2011
NOAF.CA
26/03/2012
AALR.CA
26/08/1996
CCRS.CA
30/12/2001
EIUD.CA
14/07/2011
TMGH.CA
25/11/2007
RREI.CA
11/08/2011

1,301,520,000
340,195,432
46,462,500
29,348,000
2,195,274,385
5,757,326,400
318,080,000
1,049,062,500
508,000,000
212,914,280
12,167,785
77,357,419
170,250,000
122,603,453
3,625,868,889
5,130,500,000
91,170,000
236,501,565
518,750,000
196,992,600
126,810,000
204,000,000
18,468,882,460
308,000,000

Cairo Educational Services
Assiut Islamic Trading
Misr Duty Free Shops
General Silos & Storage

Retail
CAED.CA
11/09/2000
AITG.CA
18/01/1996
MFSC.CA
19/06/1996
GSSC.CA
29/05/1996

60,504,000
40,918,176
306,562,500
168,800,000

Egyptian Media Production City

Media
MPRC.CA
26/09/1999

841,957,200

Egyptian Satellites (NileSat)
Sues Canal Company For Technology Settling
Raya Holding For Technology And Communications

Technology
EGSA.CA
09/12/1998
SCTS.CA
31/03/2004
RAYA.CA
12/05/2005

2,193,662,093
1,271,691,000
578,012,284

Global Telecom Holding
Telecom Egypt
Egyptian Company for Mobile Services (MobiNil)
Orascom Telecom Media And Technology Holding

Telecommunications
GTHE.CA
13/01/1999
ETEL.CA
29/12/1999
EMOB.CA
10/05/1998
OTMT.CA
02/01/2012

27,802,160,286
25,042,740,372
12,343,000,000
6,819,397,806

Orascom Hotels And Development
El Wadi Co. For Touristic Investement
Rowad Tourism (Al Rowad)
Remco for Touristic Villages Construction
Pyramisa Hotels
Egyptian for Tourism Resorts
TransOceans Tours
Misr Hotels

Travel & Leisure
ORHD.CA
18/06/1998
ELWA.CA
06/09/2012
ROTO.CA
28/10/1998
RTVC.CA
21/10/1998
PHTV.CA
18/02/1997
EGTS.CA
10/02/1999
TRTO.CA
02/12/1998
MHOT.CA
15/11/1994

4,312,727,955
282,600,000
155,286,846
887,330,971
324,129,885
1,942,500,000
98,070,000
270,600,000

United Housing & Development
Egyptians Housing Development & Reconstruction
Gharbia Islamic Housing Development
El Obour Real Estate Investment
Six of October Development & Investment (SODIC)
Palm Hills Development Company
National Housing for Professional Syndicates
El Kahera Housing
El Shams Housing & Urbanization
Development & Engineering Consultants
Egyptian Real Estate Group Bearer Shares
Egyptian Real Estate Group
Mena Touristic & Real Estate Investment
National Real Estate Bank for Development
Heliopolis Housing
Medinet Nasr Housing
International Co For Investment & Development
Ismailia Development and Real Estate Co
North Africa Co. for Real Estate Investment
General Company For Land Reclamation,Development & Reconstru
Gulf Canadian Real Estate Investment Co.
Egyptians For Investment & Urban Development
T M G Holding
Arab Real Estate Investment CO.-ALICO
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Orascom Development Holding (AG)
Marsa Marsa Alam For Tourism Development
Sharm Dreams Co. for Tourism Investment
Tourism Urbanization

ODHN.CA
MMAT.CA
SDTI.CA
TOUR.CA

03/12/2009
06/09/2012
18/10/2000
05/11/1995

3,333,839,570
100,800,000
585,000,000
53,349,020

Natural Gas & Mining Project (Egypt Gas)

Utilities
EGAS.CA
07/04/1992

771,240,000
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Appendix B
The following table shows the stocks included in the sample, their average return, their average
risk, their average trading volume, and their average value traded of each over the sample
Stock

Average Return

Average Risk

Average Trading Volume
655,591.04

Average Value Traded

CIEB.CA

0.0087

0.1781

SAUD.CA

0.0022

0.0674

803,839.52

5,703,437.35

FAITA.CA

0.0030

0.0536

77,054.10

345,191.50

QNBA.CA

0.0042

0.0496

959,922.28

13,122,858.76

UNBE.CA

0.0041

0.0907

168,123.70

1,064,609.81

COMI.CA

0.0038

0.0493

9,961,955.20

102,343,560.85

ADIB.CA

0.0028

0.0733

1,096,271.46

8,016,102.94

EGBE.CA

0.0010

0.0574

449,111.13

602,093.49

WATA.CA

0.0026

0.0633

572,095.33

8,260,237.40

CANA.CA

0.0007

0.0622

130,684.91

1,823,067.01

FAIT.CA

0.0061

0.0664

55,037.76

1,206,007.07

IRAX.CA

0.0035

0.0564

40,765.40

26,148,675.57

EGAL.CA

0.0021

0.0729

128,779.01

3,852,004.93

IRON.CA

0.0054

0.0965

509,456.11

9,190,283.69

ASCM.CA

0.0155

0.2350

766,725.17

9,191,715.62

SIMO.CA

0.0026

0.0853

44,782.66

527,153.01

RAKT.CA

0.0047

0.0955

206,054.26

2,237,381.59

ESRS.CA

0.0042

0.0774

5,960,803.78

71,877,534.79

SMFR.CA

0.0017

0.0798

749,619.16

5,848,832.32

ABUK.CA

0.0024

0.0426

107,975.17

10,163,878.76

MICH.CA

0.0021

0.0692

792,488.25

7,661,105.97

SKPC.CA

0.0013

0.0491

3,888,822.90

36,630,705.30

EGCH.CA

0.0068

0.0855

322,335.68

2,830,665.52

KZPC.CA

0.0033

0.0841

26,784.50

718,008.39

EFIC.CA

0.0020

0.0583

1,094,923.41

19,967,364.77

DCRC.CA

0.0028

0.0811

564,348.13

3,938,180.48

EDBM.CA

0.0075

0.1138

574,028.82

5,230,909.37

WATP.CA

-0.0007

0.0809

3,304,793.66

1,632,636.61

ARVA.CA

0.0003

0.0839

1,313,986.09

847,619.61

PACH.CA

0.0010

0.0498

123,172.28

4,338,062.06

ECAP.CA

0.0022

0.0785

1,325,060.51

8,799,119.22

NCEM.CA

0.0021

0.0718

91,141.96

1,842,648.92

TORA.CA

0.0013

0.0552

215,498.25

4,720,297.10

MBSC.CA

0.0049

0.0528

477,242.53

4,899,554.49

OCIC.CA

0.0066

0.0550

1,188,862.66

112,870,220.40
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7,767,109.28

MRCO.CA

0.0038

0.0680

31,685.69

1,085,816.02

ALEX.CA

0.0062

0.0999

593,546.87

2,688,362.31

ACRO.CA

0.0047

0.0727

77,025.44

1,224,081.85

GGCC.CA

0.0049

0.0858

767,756.54

6,509,807.87

UEGC.CA

0.0068

0.0896

16,178,701.24

22,527,222.47

NCCW.CA

0.0033

0.0824

45,544.35

1,513,023.32

SUCE.CA

0.0010

0.0508

328,644.53

9,735,749.04

CERA.CA

0.0062

0.0718

113,009.47

1,648,590.84

SCEM.CA

0.0034

0.0530

443,585.37

7,225,310.16

MCQE.CA

0.0035

0.0405

150,729.75

5,607,802.04

SVCE.CA

0.0082

0.0759

4,849,733.86

23,146,675.52

AMIA.CA

-0.0004

0.0838

192,846.30

2,253,752.31

ANFI.CA

0.0040

0.0875

39,026.20

218,680.66

GRCA.CA

0.0004

0.0709

206,161.42

704,396.19

AMER.CA

-0.0039

0.0652

42,233,156.59

6,863,764.99

EXPA.CA

0.0015

0.0556

438,620.24

4,375,884.11

MOIN.CA

0.0017

0.0643

17,263.73

354,912.19

KWIN.CA

0.0024

0.0993

95,082.19

332,260.57

HDBK.CA

0.0030

0.0702

358,819.01

9,213,970.48

DEIN.CA

0.0018

0.0634

149,406.74

1,279,862.37

SEIG.CA

0.0106

0.0874

2,574.80

120,488.27

ABRD.CA

0.0048

0.0949

1,497,623.81

11,752,606.81

CCAP.CA

-0.0026

0.0687

15,046,201.40

17,199,663.00

AIND.CA

-0.0001

0.1004

16,168,967.31

18,180,209.01

REAC.CA

-0.0074

0.1266

341,185.78

179,895.90

AIVC.CA

-0.0019

0.0528

2,935,652.43

634,811.60

NAHO.CA

-0.0022

0.0690

3,813,181.67

1,533,270.04

EASB.CA

-0.0068

0.0756

1,141,116.63

426,381.27

BTFH.CA.

0.0075

0.0709

217,135.07

342,715.97

PRMH.CA

-0.0031

0.0811

727,518.18

789,664.26

EOSB.CA

0.0098

0.1375

537,840.01

255,865.98

PIOH.CA

0.0010

0.0978

16,806,712.39

37,198,859.20

AFDI.CA

0.0017

0.0775

702,465.44

16,148,367.04

HRHO.CA

0.0034

0.0777

12,302,925.92

192,729,108.49

EKHO.CA

0.0031

0.0683

3,947,432.58

5,954,396.19

ALRA.CA

0.0192

0.1272

90,909.66

165,289.77

POUL.CA

0.0039

0.0632

546,621.22

3,580,814.88

EDFM.CA

0.0012

0.0539

57,526.44

1,797,136.97

UEFM.CA

0.0016

0.0550

71,309.25

4,140,957.26

ESGI.CA

0.0034

0.0762

192,339.34

1,960,561.82

CEFM.CA

0.0019

0.0676

163,014.49

2,887,191.85

SUGR.CA

0.0009

0.0761

437,446.49

5,725,176.71

ADPC.CA

0.0249

0.3281

59,912.96

1,155,374.54
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NEDA.CA

0.0096

0.1024

470,783.48

3,810,891.80

JUFO.CA

0.0277

0.2639

5,772,485.43

6,089,507.52

INFI.CA

0.0106

0.1159

223,588.82

1,527,179.65

ISMA.CA

0.0131

0.0988

284,157.41

704,659.21

MPCO.CA

0.0073

0.0932

227,293.05

2,431,677.36

IFAP.CA

0.0136

0.1799

1,791,342.03

6,628,410.68

EPCO.CA

0.0083

0.0935

2,863,411.02

7,840,664.66

NCMP.CA

0.0069

0.1120

620,442.50

3,930,313.40

ELNA.CA

0.0070

0.1014

300,016.76

2,880,098.57

MILS.CA

0.0003

0.0668

107,662.55

3,647,131.89

BISM.CA

0.0039

0.0561

65,074.95

1,339,498.21

AFMC.CA

0.0014

0.0764

39,355.02

849,714.53

WCDF.CA

0.0011

0.0558

63,745.59

2,187,644.23

SCFM.CA

0.0022

0.0762

30,258.71

1,108,603.78

COSG.CA

0.0015

0.0784

71,103.26

1,049,355.25

ZEOT.CA

0.0023

0.0777

4,635,815.68

10,056,779.90

MOSC.CA

0.0027

0.0763

81,422.53

1,492,377.30

SNFC.CA

0.0117

0.1162

1,138,209.41

3,451,380.28

MIPH.CA

-0.0009

0.0755

40,881.53

552,003.41

MEDU.CA

0.0021

0.0671

56,712.35

1,259,163.22

AXPH.CA

0.0019

0.0460

8,262.24

326,572.82

CPCI.CA

0.0017

0.0491

30,107.86

620,101.30

NINH.CA

0.0074

0.0794

34,279.54

445,586.39

MEDC.CA

0.0095

0.0697

11,156.63

22,255.88

MEPA.CA

-0.0102

0.0826

6,921,184.37

1,243,456.86

PHAR.CA

0.0024

0.0418

282,592.43

5,469,780.56

BIOC.CA

0.0054

0.0893

135,095.25

1,665,645.64

MPCI.CA

0.0024

0.0669

9,559.65

263,121.91

NIPH.CA

0.0039

0.0574

10,079.50

173,938.87

ADCI.CA

0.0028

0.0657

15,276.14

285,964.30

APPC.CA

-0.0025

0.0809

539,258.97

1,609,868.73

ENGC.CA

0.0049

0.0795

466,504.46

3,887,309.90

ELEC.CA

0.0029

0.0937

20,678,485.63

23,621,925.48

ETRS.CA

0.0035

0.0898

629,481.91

6,230,674.18

ALCN.CA

0.0075

0.0786

36,327.91

3,680,012.13

EPPK.CA

0.0042

0.0766

94,067.73

780,898.65

SWDY.CA

0.0025

0.0578

1,365,960.49

24,503,526.35

DTPP.CA

0.0164

0.2194

35,022.62

341,323.65

SBAG.CA

-0.0005

0.0683

1,841.65

129,032.36

EEII.CA

0.0005

0.0655

53,643.04

248,031.10

NASR.CA

0.0042

0.1009

365,941.71

3,613,452.32

CSAG.CA

0.0052

0.0906

955,983.37

10,222,002.18

MOIL.CA

0.0022

0.0998

3,161,675.94

2,138,205.40
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UASG.CA

0.0060

0.1270

3,938,567.27

8,203,674.16

SMPP.CA

0.0075

0.1015

52,999.08

491,123.33

AUTO.CA

0.0014

0.0610

503,183.38

6,902,198.03

UNIP.CA

0.0035

0.1051

341,258.18

2,639,386.26

GMCI.CA

0.0097

0.0963

1,686,695.12

3,109,140.32

AMOC.CA

0.0002

0.0422

435,660.35

16,193,582.41

KABO.CA

0.0028

0.0835

10,738,248.91

15,433,368.85

EAST.CA

0.0023

0.0435

159,088.33

14,471,197.61

APSW.CA

0.0030

0.0849

4,893,549.32

26,287,414.05

SPIN.CA

0.0383

1.0289

4,333,380.65

10,481,290.54

NCGC.CA

0.0021

0.1026

3,669,305.16

23,447,998.81

ACGC.CA

0.0022

0.0933

11,664,946.66

65,751,347.76

ORWE.CA

0.0025

0.0501

377,321.63

13,305,571.38

PRCL.CA

0.0074

0.1035

1,017,725.81

6,357,340.75

UNIT.CA

0.0052

0.0747

1,971,492.50

11,334,187.58

EHDR.CA

0.0109

0.1356

4,553,414.39

12,071,890.68

GIHD.CA

0.0099

0.1050

220,625.76

1,936,326.23

OBRI.CA

-0.0024

0.0703

89,664.50

147,372.91

OCDI.CA

0.0081

0.1217

990,517.08

35,236,623.17

PHDC.CA

0.2219

3.7964

37,914,114.10

28,644,897.42

NHPS.CA

0.0078

0.1064

30,437.24

490,236.51

ELKA.CA

0.0036

0.0741

4,527,126.25

21,661,502.45

ELSH.CA

0.0037

0.0806

1,336,754.71

5,586,859.04

DAPH.CA

0.0032

0.0798

345,500.53

5,246,582.72

AREHA.CA

0.0080

0.1254

39,507.09

616,908.28

AREH.CA

0.0027

0.1120

376,149.52

2,688,958.62

MENA.CA

0.0019

0.0807

1,252,458.16

5,552,718.49

NRPD.CA

0.0129

0.1246

642,292.11

4,872,973.81

HELI.CA

0.0029

0.0756

565,226.45

17,418,071.37

MNHD.CA

0.0035

0.0779

1,463,950.31

28,144,593.90

ICID.CA

0.0123

0.1149

118,656.71

1,522,389.12

IDRE.CA

0.0017

0.0901

568,137.54

771,198.08

NOAF.CA

0.0076

0.1391

430,667.63

152,418.92

AALR.CA

0.0131

0.1656

80,757.89

1,201,086.50

CCRS.CA

0.0071

0.1023

212,383.22

3,117,627.04

EIUD.CA

0.0057

0.1063

2,995,420.72

3,416,737.47

TMGH.CA

-0.0001

0.0671

32,833,463.66

73,152,724.11

RREI.CA

-0.0004

0.1023

10,139,443.22

8,250,981.15

CAED.CA

0.0056

0.0777

17,260.78

107,441.91

AITG.CA

0.0032

0.0831

335,267.66

1,442,697.92

MFSC.CA

0.0047

0.1115

340,732.31

1,045,334.69

GSSC.CA

0.0003

0.0706

71,027.28

2,799,758.35

MPRC.CA

0.0008

0.0835

2,801,467.02

29,872,497.93
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EGSA.CA

0.0022

0.0571

27,640.26

92,528.66

SCTS.CA

0.0028

0.0587

307,488.02

2,030,553.68

RAYA.CA

-0.0002

0.0711

3,190,820.97

13,731,221.22

GTHE.CA

0.0054

0.0754

39,038,788.38

92,623,953.36

ETEL.CA

0.0003

0.0484

7,458,054.37

61,903,274.63

EMOB.CA

0.0100

0.1351

711,522.31

75,679,516.17

OTMT.CA

0.0161

0.0596

171,202,355.78

8,201,263.07

ORHD.CA

0.0044

0.0898

1,411,811.58

23,221,744.59

ELWA.CA

0.0051

0.0833

537,210.46

573,507.15

ROTO.CA

0.0040

0.0893

193,423.63

2,029,671.56

RTVC.CA

-0.0005

0.0719

3,668,006.65

11,562,030.53

PHTV.CA

0.0014

0.0636

73,361.72

1,205,181.54

EGTS.CA

0.0063

0.0998

24,396,252.57

52,837,194.02

TRTO.CA

0.0162

0.1283

1,881,370.82

235,238.02

MHOT.CA

0.0010

0.0623

13,897.81

587,831.62

ODHN.CA

-0.0047

0.0801

106,352.53

3,576,072.62

MMAT.CA

0.0252

0.1170

1,634,294.10

318,055.07

SDTI.CA

0.0027

0.0850

160,941.01

1,298,948.61

TOUR.CA

0.0002

0.0755

61,347.13

584,448.52

EGAS.CA

0.0004

0.0547

43,113.94

3,477,493.28
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